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MARITIME PERSONAL INJURY: THE RAMIFICATIONS OF
BURNSIDE
In carrying over into admiralty the principle of workman's compen-
sation that industry shall bear the loss for personal injury due to in-
dustrial accident,' the courts have been faced with the additional prob-
lem of distributing that loss where more than one element of industry
may be chargeable with part or all of the legal responsibility for a
given injury.2 The typical, and very frequent, situation in which this
question arises in maritime law is the third party action in which the
shipowner, after having incurred liability to an injured longshoreman,
seeks to cast that liability upon the stevedoring contractor, the long-
shoreman's immediate employer. 3 Where this has been allowed, courts
have based recovery on contractual and warranty theories.4 Until re-
cently, however, such indemnity recovery based on tort was not
generally accepted.5 Moreover, while the courts have been progres-
sively more liberal in allowing recovery by injured longshoremen
against the shipowner,6 there has been a corresponding emphasis on
the problem of loss distribution among the elements of industry in-
volved. 7 Emerging from the decisions in these third-party actions is the
principle, which well may find application outside the admiralty situ-
ation, that, as between the elements of industry, the one to ultimately
bear the loss will be the one that had the best opportunity to eliminate
1. 68 CoNG. RFc. 5412-13 (1927) (debate on Longshoremen's and Harbor Worker's
Act).
2. DeGioia v. United States Lines Co., 304 F.2d 421, 426 (2d Cir. 1962).
The function of the doctrine of unseaworthiness and the corollary doctrine
of indemnification is allocation of the losses caused by shipboard injuries
to the enterprise, and within the several segments of the enterprise, to the
institution or institutions most able to minimize the particular risk involved.
3. E.g-, Hugev v. Dampskisaktieselskabet International, 170 F. Supp. 601 (S.D. Cal.
1959). See generally H. BtAR, ADmiRALTY LAW OF THE SuPREME COURT 193 (2d ed. 1969).
4. E.g., Ryan Stevedoring Co. v. Pan-Atlantic S.S. Corp, 350 U.S. 124 (1956).
5. E.g., Mikkelsen v. The Granville, 101 F. Supp. 566 (E.D. N.Y. 1951). But see
Federal Marine Terminal v. Burnside, 89 S. Ct. 1144 (1969).
6. See generally H. B.R, supra note 3.
7. James, Social Insurance and Tort Liability: The Problem of Alternative Remedies,
27 N.Y.U. L. REv. 537, 538 (1952).
The philosophy of workmen's compensation, on the other hand, is that
losses should be allocated to the enterprise that creates the hazards that cause
the losses, and ultimately distributed among those who consume its products.
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or avoid the hazard from which the injury arose." It should be noted at
the outset that emphasis in applying this principle is usually placed on
actions occurring after a hazard has been created, and its application
often results in finding liability on the part of one other than the
creator of the hazardous condition.'
AN ANALYSIS oF Burnside
In Federal Marine Terminals, Inc., v. Burnside Shipping Co.,10 what
appears to be the beginning of a culminating statement of the various
theories which have been used to implement the general policy of the
"eliminate or avoid" doctrine may be observed. But if Burnside appears
to state the present law in this regard," it also opens up a broad new area
of speculation by putting to rest the beliefs (1) that section 933 of
the Longshoremen's and Harbor Worker's Act is an exclusive rem-
edy;' 2 (2) that there can be a right over accruing to the shipowner
only where there is a contractual basis for such right;13 and (3) that the
stevedore's rights as against the shipowner are limited to subrogation
under the Act.14 Burnside, moreover, does not limit the theories of
recovery which may be available to either side.'r The third party in-
demnity cases must now be examined in the light of principles which
may be applicable to both sides of the dispute, the court in Burnside
having plainly indicated that rights and duties between these parties
are reciprocal.'Y
8. D/S Ove Skou v. Hebert, 365 F.2d 341 (5th Cir. 1966).
9. E.g., DeGioia v. United States Lines Co., 304 F.2d 421 (2d Cit. 1962) citing Water-
man S.S. Corp. v. Dugan S. McNamara, Inc., 364 U.S. 421 (1960); Paliaga v. Luckenbach
S.S. Co., 301 F.2d 403 (2d Cit. 1962).
10. 89 S. Ct. 1144 (1969), rev'g 392 F.2d 918 (7th Cir. 1968).
11. Burnside holds that:
§ 33 of the Longshoremen's and Harbor Worker's Compensation Act is not
the exclusive source of the stevedoring contractor's remedies against the
shipowner, and the latter may have a cause of action in tort for the compen-
sation payments caused by the shipowner's negligence ....
89 S. Ct. at 1154.
12. Id. at 1149.
13. Id. at 1150.
14. Id. at 1149-50.
15. Id. at 1152. "In holding that the stevedoring contractor has a direct action in tort,
we do not preclude the possibility of a direct action under some other theory."
16. Id. at 1150-54.
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Burnside is consistent with the pattern of decisions which hold
that the Jones Act,17 the Longshoremen's and Harbor Worker's Act,",
and workmen's compensation acts generally are exclusive only to the ex-
tent that they affect the employer and employee. 19 In the absence of
language to the contrary, these acts are held to provide additional rights
to injured parties within their respective ambits, and do not impair
any rights not covered, including those which may exist against third
parties, nor do they affect the rights of either the employer or the
third party with respect to each other.20 These facts, when introduced
into the admiralty framework, apparently contravene the stated pur-
pose of the Longshoreman's and Harbor Worker's Act.21 Thus, as a rule,
the acts referred to have been strictly construed, allowing the injured
party the widest of opportunities to gain adequate compensation, while
the problem of loss distribution between elements of industry has been
dealt with under principles of general common lawv.2
THEORIES OF THE ACTION-WHAT Dm Ryan REALLY SAY?
Preoccupation with finding a basis for liability characterizes many
17. 46 US.C. § 688 (1964).
18. 33 US.C. § 901 (1964).
19. E.g., N.Y. WoPuCmEN's Comp. LAw § 29 (McKinney 1965). See Wright v. Licht-
man, 36 Misc.2d 1096, 234 N.YS.2d 39 (1962).
20. See generally H. BAER, supra note 3, at §§ 1-9-15, 6-12.
21. Id., Federal Marine Terminals, Inc. v. Burnside Shipping Co, 89 S. Ct. 1144 (1969);
S. HORovrrz, INJURY AND DEATH UNDER WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION LAW 311 (1944).
The compensation statute is a complete replacement or substitute for the
common law on the subject which it covers . . . so far as it goes ....
But it does not affect rights or wrongs not within its purview, or which by
implication or express negation are excluded.
Horovitz, supra, at 311.
22. Under the act, the longshoremen's recovery is governed by a schedule of pay-
ments; 33 US.C. § 901 et seq. (1964). He avoids this schedule simply by suing the
shipowner directly where he can allege negligence and unseaworthiness and be rather
certain to reach the "deep pocket' of the vessel or its owner for a substantial sum.
Where the shipowner has a basis for liability over (usually the negligence of the claimant
or a fellow-servant which is imputed to the stevedoring contractor) he can pass on the
full liability to the stevedoring contractor. Compare Federal Marine Terminals, Inc. v.
Burnside Shipping Co., 89 S. Ct. 1144 (1969), with Ryan Stevedoring Co. v. Pan Atlantic
SS. Corp, 350 US. 124 (1956). Cf. Cusumano v. Wihelmsen, 267 F. Supp. 164 (S.D.
N.Y. 1967).
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of the cases.1a Privity or lack of it,24 and causation 5 are significant areas
of court concern in cases developing the theory of promissory liability
based on contracts express2 6 or implied in fact 27 or in law, 8 and those
which find liability based on the shipowner's rights as a third party
beneficiary.29 As the law has developed, further complications have
arisen when courts, attempting to follow what now seems to have
been a pivotal decision of the Supreme Court, Ryan Stevedoring
Co. v. Pan-Atlantic Steamship Corp.,30 interpreted that case to mean
that the existence of a contract as a basis for indemnity was a pre-
requisite." In Weyerhauser S.S. Co. v. Nacirema Operating CoY2 the
Court, referring to its Ryan decision, carefully mentioned that "in the
areas of contractual indemnity an application of the theories of 'active'
23. The warranty theory cases have followed the general trend of products liability
cases. Cases sounding in tort have been a blend of the modem warranty theory and
common principles of tort, agency, and restitution. Since these cases are tried under the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, it is interesting that this should be the case. Ryan,
Burnside, and many other cases, reflect the general confusion over "theory of the action."
The cases generally reveal a complete blend of theory. See Mikkelsen v. The Granville,
101 F. Supp. 566 (E.D. N.Y. 1951). Compare Ryan Stevedoring Co. v. Pan-Atlantic
S.S. Corp., 350 U.S. 124 (1956), with Hugev v. Dampskisaktieselskabet International, 170
F. Supp. 601 (S.D. Cal. 1959), and United States v. Rothschild International Stevedore
Co., 183 F.2d 181 (9th Cir. 1950). Cf. American President Lines v. Marine Terminals
Corp., 234 F.2d 753 (9th Cir. 1956).
24. Mikkelsen v. The Granville, 101 F. Supp. 566 (E.D. N.Y. 1951).
25. Drago v. A/S Inger, 305 F.2d 139 (2d Cir. 1962).
26. Porello v. United States, 153 F.2d 605 (2d Cit. 1946).
27. Ryan Stevedoring Co. v. Pan-Atlantic S.S. Corp., 350 U.S. 124 (1956).
28. "The right of indemnity is based upon an independent duty or obligation owed
by the employer to the third party, either as the result of express contract or as a
result of implication raised by law." 2 A. LARSEN, LAW OF WoRKcMEN's COMPENSATioN§76:10 (1952).
29. Thus while the cases speak in the language of contract, it is misleading to
cling to the literal implications of that language. The scope of the stevedor's
warranty of workmanlike performance is to be measured by the relationship
which brings it into being. Since the shipowner here was held liable for
injuries the jury found were the foreseeable result of the stevedores' failure
to perform in a workmanlike fashion, it may recover indemnification,
whether it was strictly a "third-party beneficiary" or not.
DeGioia v. United States Lines Co., 304 F.2d 421, 426 (2d. Cir. 1962).
30. 350 U.S. 124 (1956).
31. E.g., Ocean Drilling & Exploration Co. v. Berry Brothers Oilfield Service, 377
F.2d 511, 512 (5th Cit. 1967):
That case [Ryan[, as well as subsequent decisions, made it clear that such
right to indemnification is strictly contractual in nature, existing entirely
independently of tort theories based on concepts of 'active-passive' and
'primary-secondary' negligence.
32. 355 U.S. 563 (1958).
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or 'passive' as well as 'primary' or 'secondary' negligence is inap-
propriate." 3 Burnside now presents a definitive and positive statement
that duties which can be a basis for an action over may exist inde-
pendently of any contract in favor of the stevedore and, by implication,
the shipowner3 4
Since the concepts of "primary" and "secondary" or "active" and
"passive" negligence are inappropriate in actions sounding in contract,
the courts will continue to decide cases based on contract theories.
They will continue to weigh the stevedore's "warranty of workmanlike
performance" [hereinafter W-VLP] against the shipowner's conduct to
determine whether, in the face of a breach of VWLP on the part of the
stevedore, the shipowner's conduct is such as to preclude recovery
over.35 Moreover, although a valid disclaimer may be made, absent an ex-
press contract provision to disclaim or indemnify, the court will read in-
demnification into the agreement.36 The WWLP appears to exist simply
because of the relationship created by the character of the work to
be performed, and because it will be performed aboard the ship.
Therefore, the stevedore is held to his warranty, whether or not the
contract to load or unload the ship is between the stevedore and the
shipowner or between the stevedore and a third party, such as the
consignee or owner of the cargo. 7 The shipowner warrants, on the
other hand that the stevedore will have a safe place to work 3 although,
as will be shown hereafter, different standards of legal sufficiency are
applied to these reciprocal warranties.
Measures of Conduct
The performance of all warranties, express or implied, given by
the stevedore to the shipowner is apparently to be measured by
the standard of "expert." 39 Such a standard owes its force to the
33. Id. at 569. In Hugev v. Dampskisaktieselskabet International, 170 F. Supp. at 607,
the court followed what it thought Ryan, Weyerhauser, and others were saying when
it stated that "although the pleading as drawn sounds in tort, it appears settled that
the shipowner cannot recover over against the stevedoring contractor on any tort
theory."
34. 89 S. Ct. at 1150.
35. E.g., Drago v. A/S Inger, 305 F.2d 139 (2d Cir. 1962).
36. Pettus v. Grace Line, 305 F.2d 151, 155 (2d Cir. 1962).
37. Drago v. A/S Inger, 305 F.2d 139 (2d Cir. 1962).
38. Id.
39. Compare Federal Marine Terminals, Inc., v. Burnside Shipping Co., 89 S. Ct.
1144 (1969), with Hugev v. Dampskisaktieselskabet International, 170 F. Supp. 601
(S.D. Cal. 1959).
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concept that the stevedore is required to properly train and super-
vise his longshoremen, and recognizes the practical necessity of pro-
tecting the shipowner in a situation where the stevedore, as "act-
ing" party, is in control" of the people, equipment, and events, and
has the greater ability to see and forestall harm. Any other standard,
it is submitted, would work to the detriment not only of the ship-
owner, but of the very class of people the law has been most solicitous
to protect, the longshoremen themselves. Burnside appears to reject
the "reasonably safe manner" test of Weyerhauser, relying on the
standard of care stated in Hugev v. Darnpskisaktieselskabet Interna-
tional4' which, although emphasizing the duty of the shipowner, shows
that the standard required of each is different.42 From Hugev it can be
seen that the stevedore is not free from responsibility to notice de-
fects and unseaworthy conditions although courts have stated that
the stevedore has no positive duty to inspect prior to sending its long-
shoremen aboard.
The shipowner, as has been noted, warrants only that he will pro-
vide a safe place to work.44 The ship need not be free of hazards.40 A
different standard may be applied where the ship has been to sea and
40. Porello v. United States, 153 F.2d 605, 608 (2d Cir. 1946):
The primary duty to furnish its employees a safe place to work rested on the
stevedore. It was in control of the conditions under which the work was
to be done and its foreman knew the bolt was missing and should have
foreseen the danger and avoided it. Although the stevedore's default in that
respect may not relieve the shipowner from liability to the injured workman,
it would make it reasonable for the shipowner to insist that the stevedore
alone bear the loss ....
41. 89 S. Ct. at 1151 n.18.
42. It would appear immaterial as to the matter of standard of care whether the
pleading is cast in contract or in tort. Ryan, in dealing with this aspect of the problem,
says that the action is not changed from breach of contract to tort "simply because
recovery may turn upon the standard of the performance of petitioner's stevedoring
service." 350 U.S. at 134. See A. CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRAcTs (1951) §§ 571, 947,
1264; cf. RESTATEMENT OF CoNTRACrs §§295, 315 (1932).
43. Compare Vaccaro v. Alcoa Steamship Co., 405 F.2d 1133 (2d Cir. 1968) (which
holds there is no duty to inspect), 'with Pettus v. Grace Line, Inc., 305 F.2d 151 (2d
Cir. 1962) (holding that the stevedore had constructive notice of the hazard where its
longshoremen operated machinery from which a safety pin was missing for a period
of four hours and fifteen minutes).
44. 2 HARPER & JAMES, THE LAW OF TORTS § 27:12 (1956); RESTATEM-AENTr (SEcoND)
OF TORTS § 341 (1965).
45. The absolute liability for unseaworthiness which exists in favor of the individual
longshoreman does not yet extend to his stevedore employer. Cf. Federal Marine
Terminals, Inc. v. Burnside, 89 S. Ct. at 1150.
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has recently entered port after a storm.46 In such a case it is clear that
a higher degree of alertness will be required of the stevedore as its
longshoremen board the ship. The standard of care required of the
shipowner is that of "ordinary care under the circumstances," 47 and he
must give
the stevedoring contractor reasonable warning of the existence
of any latent or hidden danger which has not been remedied and
is not usually encountered or reasonably to be expected by an
expert and experienced stevedoring company in the performance
of the stevedoring work aboard the ship, if the shipowner
actually knows or, in the exercise of ordinary care under the
circumstances, should know of the existence of such danger, and
the danger is one which the shipowner should reasonably expect
a stevedoring contractor to encounter in the performance of the
stevedoring contract.48
The stevedore is not responsible for latent defects "not discoverable
by a reasonable, if only a cursory, inspection." 49Although it has been
held that it owes no duty to the shipowner to discover defects, it does
owe such a duty to its employees,50 and analysis of Burnside indicates the
possibility of such a positive duty to the shipowner as well.51
Control
Emphasis upon on-the-spot control by the stevedore, measure-
ment of its performance in not causing liability to the shipowner
against the "expert" standard, and a lesser degree of care required of the
shipowner, indicate the extent to which the underlying principle of "elim-
inate and avoid" is at work in these decisions. 2 Whether or not the
46. Victory Carriers, Inc. v. Stockton Stevedoring Corp, 388 F.2d 955 (9th Cir. 1968).
47. Federal Marine Terminals, Inc. v. Burnside Shipping Co., 89 S. Ct. 1144, 1151 n.18
(1969), citing 170 F. Supp. at 610.
48. Id.
49. Vaccaro v. Alcoa Steamship Co., 405 F.2d 1133, 1138 (2d Cir. 1968).
50. Such a duty arises out of the duty to avoid injury to an employee. But see
Mikkelsen v. The Granville, 101 F. Supp. 566 (E.D. N.Y. 1951). Cf. American Mutual
Liability Ins. Co. v. Matthews, 182 F.2d 322, 323-24 (2d Cir. 1950), and in a non-ad-
miralty situation, Westchester Lighting Co. v. Westchester County Small Estates Corp.,
278 N.Y. 175, 15 N.E.2d 567 (1938).
51. By implication, the stevedore's standard of care and his duty to avoid liability
place him in the position that, as a practical matter, he must inspect; his supervisors can-
not ignore conditions or practices which could lead to injury and the liability of the
shipowner.
52. See note 29 supra.
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stevedore has failed to meet the standards required may be a matter
which can be measured in terms of the customs, usages, and regulations
of the industry itself.5 3 "[I]ndustry's own approach [may] reflect an
exacting standard of performance," as the court found it did in D/S Ove
Skou v. Herbert, where the "fact of regulation [alone] indicated in-
dustry's awareness of the likelihood of damaged or defective hatch
boards. . . ." 5' Basing its holding on the "eliminate or avoid" principle
the court said that "[t]he stevedore having the last operational con-
tact with [the defective hatch boards] is in a position to avoid alto-
gether, or minimize greatly, the hazard."" Duties imposed by regu-
lation do not include, however, those merely suggested in a statutory
code."6
THE WWLP AND KNOWLEDGE, AcTUA. OR CONSTRUcrivE
Duties Which Arise Out of "Knowledge"
What constitutes a breach of the Warranty of Workmanlike
Performance? The cases are instructive. In Reed v. Bank Lines Ltd.,
the court held that the stevedore's implied WWLP was breached
where the injury was caused by either the injured longshore-
man or a fellow servant.57 The right of indemnity in favor of
the shipowner may exist even though the latent condition amounts
to unseaworthiness.58 Drago v. A/S Inger stands for the proposition
that although the shipowner's duty is to provide a vessel in an ef-
ficient state of repair, where there was a defective winch which caused
injury, the shipowner could have recovery over because the stevedore
breached its WWLP by failing to repair the winch. 9 Drago gives a
further insight into the standard to which the stevedore is held when
53. E.g., Federal Safety and Health Regulations for Longshoring, 29 C.F.R. § 504.31
(1969). D/S Ove Skou v. Hebert, 365 F.2d 341 (5th Cit. 1966).
54. 365 F.2d at 347-48.
55. Id. at 348.
56. Id.
57. 285 F. Supp. 808 (E.D. La. 1966).
58. Where the unseaworthiness is caused by the stevedore it may be called a "tech-
nical" breach as in Trygstad v. States Marine Corporation, 150 F. Supp. 556 (D. Ore.
1957). See also Robillard v. A.L. Burbank & Co., Ltd, 186 F. Supp. 193 (S.D.N.Y. 1966).
But if the stevedore breaches his WWLP or is primarily or actively negligent with
respect to the unseaworthiness the shipowner ought to be able to successfully prosecute
his action over. Garbellotto v. Montelindo Compagnie Navegacion, S.A. v. Pittston
Stevedoring Corp., 294 F. Supp. 487 (S.D. N.Y. 1969).
59. 305 F.2d 139 (2d Cir. 1962). See also Vaccaro v. Alcoa Steamship Co., 405 F.2d
1133 (2d Cir. 1962).
[Vol. 11:723
MARITIME PERSONAL INJURY
the court states that "the Contractor will provide all necessary labor
and services to discharge, unload and handle paper froni ships or
barges in a prompt and efficient manner." 60 The stevedore has, in ad-
dition, a positive duty to call all unseaworthy conditions it encounters
to the attention of the ship's officers.6' When the stevedore has knowl-
edge of a condition which it recognizes as unsafe it has a duty to stop
work rather than continue to work in the face of such knowledge. 2
If the stevedore proceeds in the face of a known hazard, it will incur
liability because it has "brought into play" the preexisting condition.63
Generally, the stevedore will be deemed to know of the hazard if it
is within the knowledge of its employees.64 Such knowledge may be
actual65 or constructive. 66
Conduct to Preclude
Conduct on the part of the shipowner which will be held to pre-
clude recovery over against the stevedore must be at least such as
will "prevent or seriously handicap the stevedore in his ability to do
a workmanlike job" or amount to a hindrance of the contractor in
the performance of its contractual duties.67  For example, the mere
fact that the shipowner's personnel generally supervise unloading
of the ship will not charge the shipowner with negligence where
injury results from a defective winch under the direct, detailed
control of the stevedore, even though the ship is responsible for the
defective winch.68 Neither does the fact of the shipowner's negligence
with respect to the injury preclude recovery over, 69 nor, as has been
shown, does the mere fact of unseaworthiness. 9 Moreover, where the
60. 305 F.2d at 142.
61. Smith v. Jugosalvenska Linjska Providea, 278 F.2d 176 (4th Cir. 1960).
62. The cases stress the fact that the stevedore has an alternative to continuing work.
See e.g., Misurella v. Lothmian Lines, Inc., 328 F.2d 40 (2d Cir. 1964); Nordeutsher
Loydd, Brennan v. Brady Hamilton Stevedore Co., 195 F. Supp. 680 (D. Ore. 1961).
63. E.g., Gilchrist v. Mitsui Sempaku K.K. v. Jarka Corp., 405 F.2d 763 (3d Cir. 1968).
64. E.g., Vaccaro v. Alcoa Steamship Co., 405 F.2d 1133 (2d Cir. 1968).
65. Southern Stevedoring & Contract Co. v. Hellenic Lines, Ltd., 388 F.2d 267 (5th
Cir. 1968); See also Pettus v. Grace Line, Inc., 305 F.2d 151 (2d Cir. 1962).
66. Southern Stevedoring & Contracting Co. v. Hellenic Lines, Ltd., 388 F.2d 267
(1968).
67. Albanese v. N.V. Nederl, Amerik Stoomr. Maats, 346 F.2d 481, 484 (2d Cir.
1965).
68. Id.
69. McNamara v. Weichsel Dampschifffahrts AG Kiel, Germany, 293 F.2d 900
(2d Cir. 1961).
70. D/S Ove Skou v. Hebert, 365 F.2d 341 (5th Cir. 1966).
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longshoreman has created the hazard, or the unseaworthiness, the ship-
owner has been held not to be precluded from recovery over even
where the shipowner has negligently failed to discover the danger.71
Conclusion
From the contract cases, one may justifiably reach the conclusion
that the stevedore is under a heavy burden to avoid causing liability
to the shipowner. This duty is, in essence, a practical expression of the
underlying principle of loss distribution: the loss should fall on the
one who might have best avoided or minimized it. It can readily be
seen that the resolution of these cases is based on a weighing of the
facts to determine whether, given an existing condition, the conduct
of the stevedore or the conduct of the shipowner was such, in relation
to that condition, that one or the other was in a superior position to
avoid the event which operatively caused the injury.
KNOWLEDGE REVISITED
In this determination, the element of knowledge plays a critical
part. In Vaccaro v. Alcoa Steamship Co., 72 a seaman was injured by
defective ship equipment operated by longshoremen. Holding that
the stevedore was liable over, the court stated that the duty of the
stevedore to remedy the defect arises where the dangerous condition is
present for a period of time which is of sufficient duration for the
stevedore to have constructive notice of its existence. Mere passage of
time, under this view, is sufficient to allow a holding that the stevedore's
conduct was responsible for the hazard. Yet in the same case the court
insists that the stevedore has no duty to inspect the ship before send-
ing its men aboard. It is submitted that, although such a duty may not
exist, as a practical matter the stevedore's supervisory personnel must
at least inspect the areas in which its men will work, and, in particular,
the equipment to be used. Such an inspection need only be reasonable,
and apparently need not extend to latent defects not discernible by visual
inspection.73 Moreover, even if the condition is discernible, its danger
must also be recognizable.74 Dicta in the case indicates that another ele-
ment must be present before knowledge of an employee may be imparted
71. DeGioia v. United States Lines Co., 304 F.2d 421 (2d Cir. 1962).
72. 405 F.2d 1133 (2d Cir. 1968).
73. Southern Stevedoring & Contract Co. v. Hellenic Lines, Ltd., 388 F.2d 267 (5th
Cir. 1968).
74. 405 F.2d at 1138.
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to the stevedore. Not only must the condition be discernible and
the danger apparent, but, before the unreported knowledge of a long-
shoreman can be imparted to the stevedore, it must also be shown that
the longshoreman should reasonably have believed that someone might
be injured in the use of the equipment or by the condition.75 The Ninth
Circuit has taken the view that the stevedore is "required to conduct
such a preliminary inspection as would disclose any patent conditions
of danger to which its workmen might be exposed and to take reason-
able steps to prevent such exposure." 76 The better view, and one con-
sistent with the holding in Burnside, is that the stevedore has some
positive duty to inspect. Actual or constructive knowledge of the
hazard may be a precondition of liability. If constructive, time will
play an important role, not only in the determination of the existence
of such knowledge, but in determining whether such knowledge was
acquired in time to allow action to prevent the injury. Knowledge of
the longshoreman is imputed to the stevedore. It does not matter that
the knowledge is that of non-supervisory personnel. The degree of
control, the activities of the crew, and the period of time the long-
shoremen are on board bear on this question.
A Practical Test
The attorney faced with case analysis in this situation must evaluate
the facts of his case carefully in the light of the "eliminate or avoid"
principle. A practical test might be: which of the parties under the
facts of the case had knowledge which, when considered in relation
to the time available to react, would have effectively enabled it to
eliminate or avoid or greatly minimize the hazard and to prevent the
injury?
DmEcr ACTION IN TORT
Although contractual theories have to date provided the larger
body of case law, Burnside stands for the proposition that there
are direct rights in tort arising out of the same duties to avoid
injury and liability which are emphasized in the contract cases.
Because of the tortious quality of actions based on breach of the
WWLP, and the heavy reliance of the cases on tort theories of causa-
75. Id.
76. Victory Carriers, Inc. v. Stockton Stevedoring Co, 388 F.2d 955, 959 (9th Cir.
1968).
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tion, imposition of a duty by law based upon certain relationships is
all that has been lacking to support an action for indemnity grounded on
a pure tort theory. While Burnside plainly states that there may be a
number of theories which will allow recovery, the uniqueness of the
case lies in the holding that there is a clear duty on each party not to
cause the other liability, and that this duty sounds in tort.77 Indicating
that rights and duties between stevedore and shipowner are reciprocal,
the court's holding is "limited to a rejection of Burnside's argument
that a shipowner's tortious conduct may be used as a shield, but not
as a sword." 78
The Supreme Court rejects the line of cases which implies that
there is no non-contractual right to indemnity, 0 and approves the con-
cepts set forth in Midvale Coal Co. v. Cardox Corp., where it was
held that the negligent injury of an employee by a third party gave
rise to a non-contractual right on the part of the employer to recover
the amount of increase of insurance premium charged to the employer
as a result of the injury. 0 Basing its holding on the fact that there was
an independent ground for recovery, that court held the double re-
covery doctrine inapplicable where a single act caused a breach of two
duties, one contractual, the other tortious.8s Moreover, General Aniline
& Film Corp. v. A. Schrader & Son, Inc. 82 stands for the proposition that
the payment of compensation amounts to direct and proximate damages,
a theory which Burnside embraces. 8 Thus, the elements necessary for
recovery are, apparently, a relationship brought about by employment
of the contactor's personnel on another's premises, and compensation
paid to an employee by the employer (or possibly on his behalf by
his insurer) as a result of injuries caused by the negligence of a third
77. 89 S. Ct. at 1150.
78. Id. at 1152.
79. E.g., Burnside Shipping Co. v. Federal Marine Terminals, Inc, 392 F.2d 918
(7th Cir. 1968).
80. 152 Ohio St. 437, 89 N.E.2d 673 (1949).
81. Id. In Midvale the company was allowed recovery on the basis that there was an
independent ground to support it, although Ohio law prohibited the employer from
receiving reimbursement for awards paid "from any source."
82. 12 N.Y.2d 366, 367, 190 N.E.2d 232, 233 (1963) citing Dayton Power & Light Co.
v. Westinghouse Elec. & Mfg. Co., 287 F. 439, 441 (6th Cir. 1923):
A payment of compensation absolutely required by law . . . can scarcely
be other than a proximate and direct loss. Indeed, it is difficult to conceive
how a liability could be more proximate, more direct and more immediate
than the one so created.
83. 89 S. Ct. at 1150.
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party. Burnside does not rule on the question of whether such an ac-
tion could be based on unseaworthiness alone, but indicates it may not.
Under the foregoing principles the shipowner would become a par-
ticipant in the workman's compensation scheme extended to longshore-
men under the Longshoremen and Harbor Worker's Act. Where the
longshoremen and the stevedore are free from fault, the stevedore
ought to have recovery for costs and compensation paid, regardless of
whether or not his employee failed to sue the shipowner, and regard-
less of whether the shipowner's liability to the stevedore is premised
on negligence or unseaworthiness, as long as the stevedore has been
compelled to make an award under the Act.
As it had in Ryan, the Court in Burnside recognizes that
[t]he exclusivity of the statutory compensation remedy against
the employer was designed to counterbalance the imposition of
absolute liability; there ... [being] no comparable quid pro quo
in the relationship between the employer and third persons .... 84
The Burnside Court cites its own holding in Kermarec v. Compagnie
General Transatlantique expounding the duties of the shipowner:
... the owner of a ship in navigable waters owes to all who are on
board for purposes not inimical to his legitimate interests the
duty of exercising reasonable care under the circumstances of
each case.85
Burnside continues, extending
[t1hat duty of reasonable care imposed by law . . . to the steve-
doring company as well as to others lawfully'on the ship, and its
breach gives rise to a cause of action for any damages proximately
caused. It is not disputed, for example, that if the shipowner's
negligence caused damages to the stevedoring contractor's equip-
ment, those damages would be recoverable in a direct action
sounding in tort. We can see no reason why the shipowner's
liability does not in like fashion extend to the foreseeable obliga-
tions of the stevedoring contractor for compensation payments
to the representative of a longshoreman whose death was oc-
casioned by the shipowner's breach of his duty to the stevedoring
contractor.8 0
84. Id. at 1149.
85. 358 U.S. 625, 632 (1959).
86. 89 S. Ct. at 1150.
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Because it means that for all legal purposes relating to personal injury
rights and remedies, the stevedore company is physically on board a
ship whenever its employees are, the analogy of employee to equip-
ment must be accorded great importance. It may be said with accuracy
that whenever an employee of the stevedore is aboard ship on the
stevedore's business, the company is aboard, and by its constructive
presence has certain duties owed to it. The violation of those duties will
crystallize into rights of action when the stevedore is actually damaged,
in other words, when he has to pay compensation or incurs expense
in the form of legal fees, costs, or increased insurance premiums be-
cause of injury to his employee. There appears to be no reason why
his insurer should not be subrogated to his rights in such a situation.
Burnside Transitional
The recognition of a direct right of action sounding in tort, and the
principle of reciprocity as set forth in Burnside simply clarify Ryan.
Theories of "primary" and "secondary," "active" and "passive" negli-
gence have had a development which is parallel in many respects to the
actions based on contract wherein the breach of WWLP is weighed
against "conduct such as to preclude recovery over." These cases uni-
formly appear to depend upon the same principle: that the loss distribu-
tion will be determined on the basis of who might have best eliminated,
avoided, or minimized the hazard. While here, as in the contract cases,
the discussion will be concerned primarily with actions in which the ship-
owner has sought to recover indemnity from the stevedore, it should be
remembered that under Burnside the rights and duties of both
parties arise out of their relationship, and are to some degree correlative
and reciprocal. Like the contract-warranty theories, the primary-sec-
ondary (active-passive) theories also presuppose a preexisting condition
upon which the tortfeasor will act.87 Here, instead of a breach of war-
ranty, or a failure to maintain an agreed-upon standard of performance,
there is an intervening act of negligence. 88 As in Hugev v. Dampskisak-
tieselskabet International, where the basis of the action was contractual,
the duty of the shipowner was "ordinary care," and the test of the steve-
dore's performance was that of "expert," so, too, the duty of the ship-
owner in tort is one of "ordinary care," 89 and the standard required of
the stevedore appears to be that of an "expert." Requirements and tests
87. United States v. Rothschild Int'l Stevedoring Co., 183 F.2d 181 (9th Cir. 1950).
88. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 441-43 (1965).
89. 89 S. Ct. at 1150.
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of knowledge are parallel in both contract- and tort-based actions. Il-
lustrative of the confusion caused by their parallel nature is the case of
Parenzan v. lino Kaiun Kabushiki Kaisya, which was brought on an
implied warranty theory, but which discussed the issue of liability in
terms of "proximate and primary cause" and fixed liability over on the
stevedore on the premise that the shipowner had merely created "a
condition which set the stage for" the operation of the stevedore's
negligence. 0 In this regard the language of Goldsberg v. Kollsman
Insn'ument Corp.9 is instructive. Speaking generally on the subject of
products liability the court said that
[a] breach of warranty . . . is not only a violation of the sales
contract out of which the warranty arises but is a tortious wrong
suable by a noncontracting party whose use of the warranted
article is within the reasonable contemplation of the vendor or
manufacturer.9 2
Therefore, whether the case is said to sound in contract or in tort, liabili-
ty will be determined according to the relationship of, or the existence
or nonexistence of, an act or omission which either promotes or avoids
injury by operating or failing to operate on a preexisting hazardous
condition.
CONCLUSION
Analysis indicates that the Supreme Court has taken the view that
the theory of the action is of secondary (if any) importance, and that
almost any theory will be adequate to bring the parties before the court.
What is of prime importance is the relationship between the shipowner
and the stevedore as determined with respect to elements of control and
knowledge. Thus, the principal ramifications of Burnside are that re-
gardless of the theory of the action, as a practical matter the result should
be the same. Whether the action is said to sound in tort or contract, such
casting should not be allowed to control where a result is clearly com-
pelled by the facts when viewed in the perspective of the "eliminate or
avoid" doctrine. Assuming a preexisting hazard caused by "operational"
negligence or a condition of unseaworthiness resulting from natural de-
terioration of the vessel, the operable facts fixing liability should be care-
90. 251 F.2d 928, 930 (2d Cir. 1958).
91. 12 N.Y.2d 432, 191 NE.2d 81 (1963).
92. Id. at 436, 191 N.E.2d at 82 (1963).
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fully assessed to determine who was in control of the situation. To the
extent that the act or omission can be considered a failure to eliminate,
avoid, or greatly minimize the effect of the hazard, liability will be
established. It is clear that this test places the primary duty of avoidance
on the stevedore. The stevedore has responsibility to maintain stand-
ards of supervision and training which will place its men aboard ship
with such-knowledge and experience that they will be able to recog-
nize and deal with most hazards encountered. Furthermore, the fact that
the shipowner may be able to recover indemnity from the stevedore
ought to strengthen the protection afforded to shipowner and employees
by industry codes and regulations which spell out the requirements of
proper -conduct. That the "eliminate or avoid" principle has un-
questionable validity can be recognized from the fact that under mod-
ern industry practices the stevedore, through its supervisory personnel,
has almost complete control of the working environment during oper-
ations. Out of control arises the exacting standard which the courts
have so often enforced.
A Matter of Equity or Policy?
The shipowner's absolute duty of seaworthiness, on the other hand,
and his duty of ordinary care to all who come on board with
"interests not inimical" to his, seem to place a similar exacting
burden on him. As between the stevedore and the shipowner there
must inevitably be a weighing of the equities to determine who
will ultimately pay. A question which Burnside does not answer
satisfactorily is whether or not that weighing process should take
place in all circumstances. Burnside, for example, recognizes a direct
action in tort between the stevedore and shipowner. The basis of the
action is negligence. If the real claim is for reimbursement, and the real
damage to the stevedore is the compensation paid out under the Act, then
it appears that, unless the theory of the action is to control, the stevedore
should have recovery in a direct action against the shipowner even
where the cause of the injury for which compensation has been paid
was the unseaworthiness of the vessel. No sound reason exists for
denying a complete reciprocity of restitution in the matter of loss
distribution between elements of industry.
Shipowner and Contractor: Contributing Partners in a Common Fund?
Since an excellent case can be made for reciprocity, the existing
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workmen's compensation system protecting the rights of seamen and
longshoremen should be reevaluated. Because the shipowner may now
judicially be made an unwilling partner to the stevedore in the ad-
ministration of the Act, and since the protection of the stevedore can
effectively be circumvented because of the longshoreman's right against
third parties, and the shipowner's right of action for indemnity against
the stevedore, the Longshoremen's and Harbor Worker's Act, as well
as the Jones Act and perhaps other workmen's compensation acts, are in-
adequate. In the case of the Longshoremen's and Harbor Worker's Act
it appears from the relationships involved that the shipowner should be
brought into the workmen's compensation system, with the rights of
the longshoremen guaranteed as they are now. Under this scheme the
benefits could be paid on a pro rata basis or by either the stevedore or the
shipowner upon a determination of primary liability based on' the
principle of "elimination and avoidance" as developed by the cases.
Ultimate Triumph of "Eliminate or Avoid" Principle
Whatever future legislative developments may occur, for the present
it may be assumed that third-party indemnity actions involving stevedore
contractors and shipowners will increase in number. Burnside having
opened a new avenue of recovery to the stevedore, and perhaps, by impli-
cation, to the shipowner, the Court, through that case, has approved all
theories of action which reasonably tend to promote loss distribution
based on primary responsibility to eliminate or avoid hazard. More-
over, the fact that the stevedore company is constructively aboard a
vessel for most legal purposes incident to loss distribution indicates
that the primary burden will usually be on the stevedore to avoid a
given injury.
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